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A stra t 
This study aims to give an overview of the clauses of the Treaty of Trianon specifically 
targeted at the Hungarian system of transportation, and its overall impact on the country’s 
infrastructure. In the place of well-publicized slogans of “national self-determination,” 
economic and strategic considerations were primarily at play in this issue, with the system 
of transportation at their intersection. Since railways represented the most important 
means of transportation at that time, given the fact that train connections were fast, cheap, 
and had a huge transport capacity, railroads came to the forefront of the postwar border 
settlement second only to natural or ethnic boundaries that could serve as bulwarks of the 
new borders. As it is commonly known, new borders created new divisions, cutting 
through traditional economic units, detaching ma or cities from their hinterlands. It is less 
well known what the repercussions were of the maimed transportation infrastructure on 
the national and regional levels. 
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Intro u tion 
New state boundaries were drawn at the end of the First World War. What was initially  
national upheaval in the name of “national self-determination” and enthusiasm for an 
independent national home to many, soon transformed into a race for territory to be ceded 
from countries that lost the war. So this happened in the case of the Dual Monarchy, too. 
 
1 Archivist at the Hungarian National Archives (Magyar  emzeti  e éltár, MN ), PhD aspirant at 
Eszterházy Károly University of Eger. His research has been supported by the grant EFOP- . .1-1 -201 -
00001 “Complex improvement of research capacities and services at Eszterházy Károly University.” 
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Due to revolutions,2 a popular upheaval establishing a weak republic, and a Communist 
 palace coup’, Hungary signed the peace treaty only on June  , 1920. It reduced the 
country’s territory to its third, and its population to    percent. The loss of homogenous 
Hungarian blocs, often along the Hungarian border, was pronouncedly painful. For 
practically everyone in Hungary, this signaled the greed of the  successor states’ (i.e. new 
states formed from the territory of the Dual Monarchy), and demonstrated the 
unreasonable nature of the postwar settlement. A vast ma ority of contemporaries,  and 
even the later generations have not realized that the new borders taking shape during the 
spring of 1919 were in fact truly logical developments – seen from the angle of the 
neighboring countries. 
 The plans for postwar Europe, arising one after the other during the war, of the 
Entente – especially France – understandably focused on the weakening of Germany and 
on keeping it in check for the future. As for the Dual Monarchy, the solution in the eyes 
of the West European Allies was basically to keep Austria–Hungary intact but won over 
to the side of the Entente, thus effectively cornering Germany in a pincer move, and to 
preclude any possibility of a Mittele ro a-type Central European integration. After the 
peace overtures of Charles IV of Hungary (Karl I in Austria), the memorable Sixtus 
 etters, went awry, the Hungarian king (and Austrian emperor) had to restrengthen his 
loyalty to the German emperor Wilhelm II on May 12, 191 , under humiliating 
provisions. This development made it obvious to  ondon and Paris that the Austro–
Hungarian state is subservient to the German Reich not only in the economic and military 
fields, but also politically. A new concept had to be developed. This alternative became 
the alliance of newly established states – carved out from the Slav-populated regions of 
Germany and the Monarchy – later to be  oined by an enlarged Romania. The  ittle 
Entente (this apt term was coined by the Hungarian press some time in 1921) had a dual 
 
2 The so-called Aster Revolution, from 2  to  1 October, ousted the old elite of the Kingdom of Hungary 
from power, installing a democratically inclined republic instead. Due to increasing pressure from the 
Entente as well as the destituteness of postwar conditions, President count Mihály Károlyi was couped on 
21 March. Political prisoners, including Communist, were released from prison, and on that day they took 
power in the country to establish a Hungarian Soviet Republic according to the Russian model. It lasted 
until August 1, 1919 when Romanian forces entered the Hungarian capital. 
  “Railway experts, responsible for contemporary transportation policies, simply did not get why had the 
Entente defined the borders of Hungary at the Paris Peace Conference in such a way as it did, marking lines 
on the map, without giving regard to any possible interest of the Hungarian State Railways (Magyar 
 llam a  tak), ignoring all the rational economic and railway technical arguments of the railway 
management” (Eper esi, 1992: 1 2). 
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task: to threaten Germany from the East, and to separate Soviet-Russia from Europe.  
French diplomacy had sketched plans for establishing smaller allied states in the wake of 
the division of the Habsburg Empire already in late-191 , after the scandal over the Sixtus 
 etters broke (Romsics 200 :   ). In order to make this plan feasible, the strengthening 
of the successor states became a must, thus replacing the principles of “national self-
determination” with those of an economic strategy related to delineating the prospective 
new borders. Nevertheless, if the maximum of demands emanating from these 
considerations and the interests of the newly established states would have been met 
without restriction, the new borders of Hungary would have run along the lines of Fertő, 
Győr, Budapest, Jászberény, Szolnok, Pusztaszer, Ba a, Kaposvár, Nagykanizsa, 
Zalaegerszeg and Szombathely (Suba, 1999: 1 ). 
 The weak point of the plan was implementation. Poland, now liberated from under 
the imperial rule and partition that lasted over one-hundred years, was surrounded by 
Germany and Russia, its two historical archenemies. The multiethnic Czechoslovakia, 
due to its Hungarian minority issue, could not concentrate exclusively on Germany  and 
likewise, the multiethnic  ugoslavia had to divide its focus between Hungary and Italy, 
alongside having a degree of tension with its ally, Romania, over the fertile Banat region, 
as well.  Czechoslovakia and  ugoslavia were also affected by the aspirations of their 
own  titulary’ nationalities. The Croats expressed their disappointment already in the 
early 1920s with their new country, dominated by the Serbs, while a Slovak 
disenchantment with the Prague-based elite of Czechoslovakia took shape somewhat 
later. Both national movements lent support for the destruction of their respective 
compound countries at the earliest convencience. Romania absorbed many minorities 
with its con uests after the war, although their overall proportion was not as high as that 
of the minority or lesser nationalities in the previously mentioned Slavic countries. Still, 
the Hungarian, Bulgarian, and Soviet-Russian neighbors were glowing with vengefulness 
– something they could finally release in the early 19 0s. 
 Thus, when on May  , 1919, in Paris, the English, French, and Italian delegations 
– without regard to the perspective of those on the losing side – drew the new borderlines 
 
  The concept was a ’sanitary cordon’ (Fr.  ordon  anitaire) to isolate Soviet-Russia lest the Soviet ’virus’ 
infect other European countries. It was a common term for the chain of countries from the Baltics through 
Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Romania. 
  A ma or region of the historic Kingdom of Hungary divided into three by the Treaty of Trianon: today its 
western parts lay in Romania, the eastern ones in Serbia, while a smaller northern portion remained in 
Hungary. 
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in Central and Eastern Europe, they effectively sacrificed long-term stability on the altar 
of an overvalued alliance system (Palotás, 1990: 21). While the basis of this settlement 
was the principle of “national self-determination,” there were economic considerations, 
represented by resources, industrial centers and transportation capacities, and the issue of 
the fate of infrastructure in the territory of the Dual Monarchy connected to these. 
Furthermore, strategic considerations were also at play, given that the system of railways 
could always serve military deployment and facilitate inter-allied communication as well. 
These were the ma or reasons as to why even purely Hungarian territories were eventually 
ceded to the successor states. 
 
 ail a s an   or ers 
The bulk of Hungarian economic and transportation experts have not relized the 
connection between the new borders and the railways, even as the track of railways 
determined as much as  0  of the net length of the borderlines delineated by the Treaty 
of Trianon. The present study summarizes the reasons behind the delineation of the new 
tracks, drawing on the research of Zoltán Palotás (Palotás, 1990:   –  ), its impact on 
railway transportation based on the  oint study of the post-WWII Department for the 
Preparation for Peace at the Hungarian Minsitry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of 
Transport, as well as the proposals and summaries made by the Directorate of the 
Hungarian State Railways during the first half of 19  . 
 
  e  oun ar   it  C e  oslova ia 
Czechoslovakia’s geographical features profoundly influenced the final shape of the 
Czechoslovak–Hungarian border. This country was essentially a compound of two parts: 
the former Czech province of the former Austrian half of the Habsburg Monarchy, and 
parts of Upper Hungary and Carpatho-Ruthenia of the Hungarian half. The wedge-shaped 
entity was narrowing from West to East along a longitudinal axis of some 1000 kms. The 
Carpathian mountain range reached the eastern part of the country, which was dotted with 
North–South-oriented valleys. In the north, East–West connection was only provided by 
the valleys of the rivers Vág (in Slovak: Váh) and Hernád (Hornád), while in the south, 
such corridors only existed in the linguistically Hungarian territories. The railway 
connection that ran through the country with a length of 1 00 km began at Cheb in the 
west, on through Prague and Oderberg (Bohum n), reaching Kassa (Ko ice) and, in the 
far eastern part of the country, Kőr smező ( asinia). East of Kassa (Ko ice) there 
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remained only one track that led to Carpatho-Ruthenia  on top of that, the Kassa–
Sátral a  hely–Csap (Chop)–Királyháza (Korolevo)–Kőr smező ( asinia) line provided 
a direct connection to Romania at Halmi (Halmeu). Although the Slovak state did not 
exist prior to the First World War, the province had historical precursors, and its Northern 
and Western boundaries were accepted on a nationality basis. Its southern border was 
lingering open-ended with its North–South-oriented valleys. Territories northeast of 
 osonc ( u enec) and east of Kassa (Ko ice) would have been left without railway 
connection in the absence of a ma or East–West railroad running in the South. That is 
why the new boundaries had to be drawn running well within the territory of the 
Hungarian-language bloc, and with the connecting line along the Pozsony (Bratislava)–
Galánta (Galanta)–Vágsellye ( a a)–T tmegyer (Palárikovo)– éva ( evice) route 
connecting the western and eastern railway systems of the new country. The fertile lands 
of the Csall k z ( itn  ostrov) were ceded to Slovakia so as to service its highland 
industries  although, in this instance, the Danube River as a legitimate  natural boundary’ 
came handy. From the mouth of the River Ipoly (Ipel’) to the easternmost part of the 
country, the whole eastern section of the Hungarian–Czechoslovakian border was 
determined by this railway that is still running  ust a few kilometers north of the border. 
To the southern route of such vital importance to the newborn state, the North–South lines 
connected at the stations of Ipolyság (Ipolské  iahy),  osonc ( u enec), F lek 
(Fi akovo), and Feled (Feledince). “Both the Kassa–Csap (Chop)–Királyháza (Korolevo) 
and the Kassa (Ko ice)–  osonc ( u enec)  main lines were running to their end stations 
within territories with a Hungarian ma ority,  ust a few kilometers north of the Trianon-
designated border. The boundary, running in parallel to the southern railway line, is 
undoubtedly an “economically, specifically infrastructurally, devised line” (Palotás, 
1990:   ). It is not by accident that in the August 2, 1921 session of the Hungarian–
Czechoslovak Boundary Commission, the Hungarian party re uested another track, along 
Pozsony (Bratislava)–Nagyszombat (Trnava)–Z lyom (Zvolen)–Murány (Murá )–
Rozsny  (Ro  ava)–Kassa (Ko ice)–Perecseny (Perechyn)–Huszt (Khust), as being 
more appropriate from the viewpoint of Hungarians. Prague re ected the idea without 
consideration. The same thing happened to the second proposition that Budapest made, 
on August 20, wherein it would have given up only on the Hungarian-speaking 
community to the east of Kassa (Ko ice). In order to substitute for the worthwhile track 
of Kassa (Ko ice)–Sátoral a  hely–Csap (Chop), the Hungarian party proposed to build 
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a new line between Carpatho-Ruthenia and Western Slovakia on favorable terms, but the 
proposal was to no avail (Suba 1999: 1 ). 
 From an economic point of view, the most serious conse uences   beyond the 
fact that railway  unctures were themselves economic hubs and now became inaccessible 
for most of their hinterlands   were brought about by the loss of Kassa (Ko ice) and its 
surroundings, as well as the valley of the Rima River. The administrative, educational, 
and industrial significance of Kassa (Ko ice) may speak for itself.  ess well-known is the 
fact that the cession of the Rima Valley forced a complete change of course on one of the 
flagships of pre-war Hungarian industry, the Rimamurány-Salg tar án Ironwork Co. Its 
iron ore mines were still operating but now fell on the other side of the border. Thus, 
additional costs were generated by customs and transportation using the services of the 
Czechoslovak State Railways. Furthermore, the steel produced at the smeltery of  zd 
then had to travel 21  km instead of the earlier  0 km, since the Bánréve– osonc 
( u enec)–F lek (Fi akovo) line was awarded to Czechoslovakia (Ministry of Transport, 
19  :  –10). On a local level, N grád county can be cited as an example of the effects of 
separation: the Railway of the Ipoly (Ipel’) Valley was segmented into three smaller 
sections, by which the immediate connection between the agricultural area of West 
N grád and the industrial zone of East N grád ceased to exist. Although there were, post-
19  , plans to restore this connection with a new line between Szécsény and Salg tar án, 
and another plan was conceived based on a prospective  zd–Pétervására–Kisternye track, 
both of these proposals remained on paper. 
 Another repercussion of delineating the new boundaries with Czechoslovakia was 
Hungary’s losing its most important Western connection: the principle railroad from 
Budapest to Vienna through Vác,  rsek  vár (Nové Zámky), and Pozsony (Bratislava), 
an all-the-way double-track railway. The other line on the right bank of the Danube, 
running through Komárom and Győr, had only become a principal railway following the 
Treaty of Trianon, out of necessity. For this decision, however, a second track needed to 
be constructed in 192  between Győr and Hegyeshalom, as well as minor line corrections 
had to be made in the Vértes mountains, since those lines had originally been built with 
secondary-line parameters back in the late-1  0s. 
 
  e  oun ar   it   o ania 
The Bucharest elite first imagined a new Romanian boundary by the river Tisza, a 
proposition which the Entente did not wish to accommodate, party as “punishment” for 
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the separate peace with the Central Powers which Romania concluded in 191 .  However, 
a vast territory as far west as the rimlands of the Great Hungarian Plains were ceded to 
Romania. With Transylvania, the parts of the Partium  and the Banat, some 10  000 km2 
of territory, came under Romanian sovereignty, which was an altogether larger area than 
the one which remained under Hungarian control. With those territories, Transylvanian 
ore and salt, and vast forest regions, were ceded to Romania, as well as important 
industrial centers which earlier played a key role in the economy of the Habsburg 
Monarchy: Arad (Arad), Brass  (Bra ov), Petrozsény (Petro ani), Resicabánya (Re i a), 
Temesvár (Timi oara), and Va dahunyad (Hunedoara). 
 Due to the geographical features of the ceded territories, there are were few 
transportation corridors between Transylvania and the Partium. For strategic and 
economic reasons, the Western boundaries of Romania could not spare the connector–
distributor lines linking together these scarce corridors through a North–South axis, 
which, on top of that, connects to the Kassa–Csap (Chop)–Kőr smező ( asinia) line as 
well. It is not by accident, then, that the new boundary was moulded to follow the Arad 
(Arad)–Nagyszalonta (Salonta)–Nagyvárad (Oradea)–Szatmárnémeti (Satu Mare)–
Királyháza (Korolevo) line, about   to   km away to the west. The transversal corridor 
connecting the so-called market towns has been nearly completed by 191  – the phase 
between Kis enő (Chi in u) and Nagyszalonta (Salonta) were later built by the Romanian 
rail company, while some sections with weaker structures were upgraded to principal-line 
level – the original aim, when these sections were built, was to provide for an alternative 
so that all East–West transport not go through the radial lanes converging in the 
Hungarian capital, to thus relieve Budapest. Prior to the war, it was the market places of 
Arad (Arad), Nagyszalonta (Salonta), Nagyvárad (Oradea), Nagykároly (Careie), 
Szatmárnémeti (Satu Mare) (as well as Beregszász  Beregove ) where the agricultural 
goods of the Great Plains could be exchanged for the raw materials of the mountain 
ranges. By ceding those cities, but not their hinderlands, the latter were left without their 
 
  After the Treaty of Brest- itovsk (March  , 191 ) Romania became isolated in the eastern theater of war. 
Due to the military advances of the Central Powers, Romania unilaterally sued for peace. By the Treaty of 
Bucharest (May  , 191 ), the country ceded most of Dobru a to Bulgaria, leased oil wells to the German 
 ei  , and gave control of the mountain passes to Austria–Hungary, in return for the recognition of 
Romanian unity with Bessarabia.  
  Hungarian region, formed during the Early Modern Period that geographically and culturally belonged to 
Hungary proper, while it was under the authority of the Principality of Transylvania. Its name Parti m is 
derived from the  atin word  ar  (  a part), meaning that these territories were “parts of Hungary” ad oint 
to Transylvania. By the Treaty of Trianon, the Parti m was divided with some  0  ceded to Romania, 
20  remaining in Hungary, while another 20  was ceded to Czechoslovakia. This latter part was annexed 
by the Soviet Union during WWII and now forms part of Ukraine under the name Carpatho-Ukraine. 
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natural markets, and most of today’s Szabolcs-Szatmár and Ha d -Bihar counties were 
practically left without urban centres. In turn, with the mutilation of their agglomeration, 
these market towns, becoming part of Romania, have lost their primary trading functions, 
since they could not exchange the minerals and timber of the mountains for agricultural 
products from the Plains. 
 
  e  oun aries  it  t e  in  o  of  er s  Croats  an   lovenes 
The basis of Serbian aspirations was the line along the river Dráva (Drava)–Pécs–Ba a–
Szeged–river Maros (Mure ): partly to secure natural boundaries provided by the two 
rivers, partly to ac uire hard coal mines in the Baranya region, partly to secure the 
inclusion of strategic transportation hubs like Szeged, Ba a, and particulary the Danube 
bridge at Ba a. While ethnic composition was obvious in Slavonia’s case, the Slavic 
element amounted to a mere 20  in the Drávasz g (i.e. “Drava corner”), while the Bácska 
region was considered all-Hungarian as far as the Ferenc Channel (the Danube–Tisa–
Danube Canal). The Drávasz g came under the authority of Belgrade due to military 
considerations, while Szabadka (Subotica) had to be ceded with a view to transportation. 
 It was not by chance that French and Serbian troops marched as far as this line in 
the final phase of WWI, since there were no railway bridges on the Danube south of 
Belgrade, and neither were there any on the Tisza south of Szeged. By this time, the only 
route to Romania went through Szeged: that is why it was only after the completion of 
the Tisza Bridge at Zenta (Senta) that occupation forces  were withdrawn from Szeged. 
To do so, they had to make principal railways out of the secondary ones, and construct 
the missing phases, such as the one between Zenta (Senta) and Cs ka ( oka), spanning a 
distance of 10 kms, alongside the aforementioned bridge over the Tisza river. The famous 
Simplon–Orient Express was operating from Paris to Istanbul, getting around Hungary 
from the south, on the line of Paris–Milan–Trieste–Zagreb–Vinkovici(–Belgrade–Ni –
Istanbul)–Szabadka (Subotica)–Zenta (Senta)–Nagykikinda (Kikinda)–Temesvár 
(Timi oara)–Orsova (Or ova)–Bucharest. 
 From a Hungarian perspective, by ceding Szabadka (Subotica), the route from 
Ba a to Szeged was prolonged from    kms to 1 0 kms by adding a detour along 
 
  Parts of Hungary were occupied since November 1919 but the use of force was specifically encouraged 
by the Entente in order to “stop the spread of Bolshevism.” The Hungarian Soviet Republic, already under 
a lot of domestic and international stress, was already on the verge of collapse, but the short Romanian 
occupation of Budapest gave its  o   de gra e. Several days later, the Entente ordered the Romanian army 
to withdraw. 
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Kiskunfélegyháza–Kiskunhalas–Bácsalmás, which practically meant a 120  rise in 
 ourney length and a  0 to     rise in added transport costs. To a lesser extent and with 
lesser impact, the cession of Regőce (Ri ica) had the same conse uences. By awarding 
the  uncture of vicinal railways to the Southern Slav state, the territories south of the Ba a–
Bácsalmás line lost their railway connection. With the cession of the Drávasz g region, 
townships along the Drava river had to pay more for transport, since they had to turn to 
the route from Pécs through Mohács to finally embark their agricultural products, for 
water transport – instead of simply using the Danube port at Kiskőszeg (Batina). 
 The Romanian–Hungarian–Serbian boundary, on top of that, divided the 
Domb vár–Ba a–Békéscsaba–Nagyvárad (Oradea) transversal lane into three, the track 
which previously connected the Great Plains to the Danube–Tisza Interfluve and 
Transdanubia. Tranports from the Viharsarok region to the Baranya region thus depended 
on either the longer bypass to Budapest (on a prinicipal railway), or the somewhat shorter 
(but more time-consuming) bypass to Ba a (Minsitry of Transport, 19  :  –10). 
 
  e  oun ar   it  Austria 
The boundary between Austria and Hungary is the only border drawn during the Paris 
Peace Conference in a way that may be described as sensitive to ethnographic realities – 
only a population of cca. 10,000 Hungarians were assigned to the Republic of German 
Austria. From an infrastructure perspective, it was only the bisecting of the Sopron–
Kőszeg lane that caused some difficulties, as well as the minor B k (Wichs)–Felsőlászl  
(Oberloisdorf) lane connecting to the former. Albeit at some extra cost and extra time, the 
principal line between Sopron and Szombathely could serve the needs of its broader 
environment   although Sopron, Szombathely, and Kőszeg were hit hard by losing their 
western hinterlands. 
 
  e i  a t of t e  ea e  reat  on t e  un arian trans ortation s ste  
The kingdom of Hungary lost two-thirds of its territory and     of its population. The 
country shrank from a territory of 2 2 000 km2 to 9  000 km2, but this area retained the 
bulk of its processing capacities, while the resources of mountains and forests went to the 
successor states (Romsics, 200 : 1  ). It was a unitary economic system that was divided: 
“With the division of Hungary, the unity of economies, traffic, river control, water 
management and forestry was over” (Czére, 2000:   ). 
 .   T R  Y  CO O RN              
  i    .             .    v      
   
 
 In terms of the national road network, the country faced serious losses, too: only 
2 ,    km of public roads (    of the pre-war total) were left within Hungary’s new 
confines, and, on top of that, there were only a few in the Great Plains which were able 
to service traffic during the heavy spring and autumn rainfalls. Due to the geographic 
features of the Carpathian Basin, and the previous infrastructure of the country, the 
number of bridges dropped by only  2 . As for the number of registered passanger cars, 
by the end of 1919, there remained hardly any car in running order. During WWI, many 
passanger cars was confiscated by the army and were later destroyed or looted by enemy 
forces  another portion broke down due to tyre and fuel shortages. During the time of its 
reign, the Hungarian Soviet Republic could only confiscate a few cars and trucks from 
the civilian population. After the war and revolutions, not many vehicles were 
operational: in late-191 , the number of registered passanger cars was still  1  , while 
by 1920 a mere 1  2 appeared in statistical data, although by this time, however small in 
numbers, vehicle imports began to expand (Frisnyák, 2001: 1  , 1  ). Due to tyre 
shortages, some of the vehicles ran on iron rims. On October 1 , 1920, the speed limit 
and area accessible by vehicles on iron rims have been reduced, but the use of tyres was 
only prescribed as late as in 192  (Frisnyák, 2001: 1  ). 
 New boundaries naturally had an impact on the public road system as well, 
although the documents for the preparation of peace in 19   only mentioned the public 
roads connecting to 2 or   villages that have become difficult to access, and the 
complaints of the villagers who conse uently had to make large detours. By tearing 
natural agglomeration apart, new roads had to be constructed to make regional hubs 
available for those townships that have lost their previous connections. The longest such 
road was 121 km long, connecting Bátaszék, Ba a and Szeged. Minor ones were 
constructed near Barcs and Debrecen. Altogether, as much as 1   kms of new public 
roads were built due to the change of state borders. 
 As there was not enough money and labor allocated to the maintenance of 
railroads, the servicing of public roads was also in a state of gradual decay. While in 191 , 
for the maintenance of state roads,  2 m  crush stone and gravel was used, this number 
shrank to   m  and zero, respectively, by 1919. By 192 , only  0  of public roads was 
up to pre-war  uality. Alongside the general economic environment, an additional factor 
behind this deterioriaton was the fact that important mines were ceded to other countries, 
and those remaining in the mountains of the Bakony, B rzs ny, Cserhát, and Toka -
Zemplén mountains could not fully meet the demand of Hungary (M V, 19  :   –9 ). 
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 Railways were hit hardest: out of its 22,  9 kms of network length, only  , 0  
kms remained within the new confines of the country, and the most important  unctures, 
as was demonstrated earlier, were ceded to the successor states. In the unitary economic 
zone of Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, there were only five customs toll stations in the 
direction of Romania and Serbia. Newly established boundaries, however, cut across  0 
railways in open line, creating  2 new border stations, and the successor states were only 
willing to take over traffic at 22 locations. After 1920, Hungary had to broker separate 
economic and trade agreements with all of the four successor states. The hardships of 
railway transportation were exacerbated by the fact that the Romanian army looted two-
thirds of Hungarian engines, and four-fifths of carriages, and there was also a general 
shortage of coal, steel and oil (Czére, 2000:   – 2). Due to boundary delinations, the 
Fehérgyarmat–Za ta line was separated from the national network, and this region along 
the Szamos River was re-included only by early 192 . 
 Article  02 of the Treaty of Trianon gave the right to the Czechoslovak state 
railways to use the Hungarian phase of the  osonc ( u enec)–Csata ( ata) line with their 
own vehicles and personnel for 1  years. The same beneficial treatement was due to the 
Romanian railways, for 10 years, for using the line connecting Nagyszalonta (Salonta)–
Békéscsaba–Arad (Arad)–Kis enő (Chi in u). In Article  0 , as a sort of compensation 
for the Czech–Serbian corridor that never came to be, Czechoslovakia got the right to 
transport, with its own vehicles and personnel, along the Pozsony (Bratislava)–Sopron–
Szombathely–Murakereszt r–Pragerhof–Fiume (Ri eka) and the Pozsony (Bratislava)–
Hegyeshalom–Csorna–Hegyfalu–Zalaszentiván–Murakereszt r–Fiume (Ri eka) lines to 
the Adrian ports. In order to ensure operations, the Czechoslovak state also had the right 
to build maintenance facilities on Hungarian soil. On top of that, if the Czechs demanded 
it, the Hungarian state would have been obliged to renovate the Pozsony (Bratislava)–
Nagykanizsa line for the trains that were called vernacularly as “the corridor trains” 
(Eper esi, 1992: 1  ). 
 Neighboring countries, in order to tighten their grip on Hungary and make 
economic recovery more difficult, wanted to exclude the country from international 
transportation of which one symbolic example was the redirection of the Orient Express 
from its original track. Instead of running through Vienna and Budapest, a Paris–Milan–
Trieste–Zagreb–Temesvár (Timi oara)–Bucharest track was assigned to the famous 
luxury railway until June 1, 1921, when it was re-directed back to its original line. 
Interstate economic, trade, and transportation solutions were, due to the reasons detailed 
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above, prolonged until the end of 19 2. As to passanger traffic and the transportation of 
goods, the first immediate bilateral treaty was signed with Czechoslovakia on November 
 , 1922. The last in the series of such agreements was with Romania on December 2 , 
19 2 (Eper esi, 1992: 1  –1  ). 
 Successor states were often willing to undertake additional costs and travel 
duration due to detours so as not to let Hungary reap high transit profits. Due to traffic 
detour, the yearly 1.  million tons of transit traffic registered by M V (Hungarian State 
Railways) dropped to  00,000 tons, and in spite of all the pricing efforts and international 
agreements, it could not surpass   0,000 tons by 19  . This was, of course, a serious loss 
of profits for the country’s economy. The three members of the  ittle Entente could 
transport through the Orsova (Or ova)–Temesvár (Timi oara)–Arad (Arad)–Nagyvárad 
(Oradea)–Szatmárnémeti (Satu  Mare)–Halmi (Halmeu) line – although this meant a 
lengthy detour. Through the territory of Hungary, the distance between Brno and Arad 
was only  09 km. The distance to be covered grew to 102  kms via Kassa (Ko ice) and 
Királyháza (Korolevo), when circumventing Hungarian territory. Similar disadvantages 
applied to travelling from Vienna to Belgrade (91  kms instead of  1  kms) or from 
Zagreb to Kassa (Ko ice) (1002 kms instead of     kms) when taking a circumventing 
detour (M V, 19  : 11–2 ). 
 It is worth mentioning how the successor states maintained the railway system in 
the interwar period. The best performance was that of the Czechoslovak State Railways 
who replaced the older tracks on a length of  9  kms between 1919 and 19  . They 
modernized not only the strategically important East–West lanes but also the offsetting 
minor ones. New trackways were only laid at the Kassa (Ko ice) station in   kms length 
for the subordinate yard, and a  -kilometre delta track at Sa  lénártfalva ( enartovce) so 
as to be able to bypass Bánréve on Hungarian soil, when travelling from Kassa (Ko ice) 
to F lek (Fil’akovo). According to the assessment of the Hungarian State Railways 
(M V), in the 20-year period in  uestion, the Czechoslovak state proportionally invested 
as much into the railway system of former Upper Hungary as did M V for its own 
railways in the same period. 
 On the other hand, Romanian State Railways only replaced     kms of tracks 
between 1919 to 19 0. Only 90 kms of new lanes and tracks were built, and these mostly 
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out of strategic considerations. Expressed in 19   terms, a total of 110 million  eng 9 
was spent on the development of the railway system of Transylvania. 
 The South Slav state only modernized the line between Szabadka (Subotica) and 
  vidék (Novi Sad) and the one between Szabadka (Subotica) and Zenta (Senta) between 
1919 and 19 1, amounted to  2 kms covered. Only as little as   million  eng  worth was 
invested in the railway systems of the Bácska and Bánát regions, which – given the high 
density of the network there – was practically insignificant (Vas ti kérdések, 19  ).  
 A common myth needs to be addressed with regard to the effects of the peace 
treaty. This false thesis was first published in the work of Béla Unyi, in his 
Tran  ormation o  o r  ail ay Sy tem  rom      to o r Time  (Vas thál zatunk 
alakulása 191 -től nap ainkig), according to which certain doube-track lanes – namely, 
the Hatvan–Salg tar án, Békéscsaba–  k sháza, and Budapeset–Kunszentmikl s–Tass 
lanes – had to be removed at the insistence of the  ittle Entente powers so as to evade a 
possible Hungarian mobilization along those lines (Unyi, 19 9: 10).10 There was no such 
clause in the Treaty of Trianon, no documents were found which would support this 
finding, and neither daily papers nor the  ail ay and Tran  ortation Gazette (Vas ti és 
K zlekedési K zl ny) took notice of track removal for military reasons, as suggested in 
the above- uoted piece of work. The Hatvan–Salg tar án lane operated on a double-track 
until its destruction in WWII. Along the way to Belgrad, a second track was indeed built 
from Budapest to Kunszentmikl s–Tass by the summer of 191  (Keller, 1992:    ), 
although the lost war and the new borders delineated by the peace treaty made it 
unnecessary to use or build second tracks there. The traffic, scarce as it was due to coal 
and vehicle shortages, could be operated on single-tracks  ust as well on the much more 
fre uented principal railways. Removal of tracks, where it indeed took place, was rather 
a conse uence of the desperate shortage of material. During war times, the enormous 
traffic and the relatively low level of maintenance left the lanes in dangerous conditions. 
The economic position of the country did not make it feasible to procure enough steel, 
and constructors needed to obtain the necessary material by removing existing, lesser 
tracks to maintain traffic along the critical sections of the system (about material 
procurement practices of M V, see Kelety, 1921: 200–20 ). 
 
9 Hungarian currency at the time, used between 192  and 19  . 
10 The theory is further contradicted by the fact that the double-track principal railway of Budapest–
Miskolc–Sátoral a  hely is not included, in spite of being a principal route reaching as far as the state 
boundary, at a place as strategically distant from Prague as Kassa (Ko ice). 
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 As for waterways, the immediate domestic connection between the Danube and 
the Tisza ceased to exist, as the Francis Channel was ceded to the South Slav sate. The 
Hungarian section of the Danube was shortened from 92  kms to  1  kms, while that of 
Tisza’s from   0 to   2. Domestic waterways had a net total length of  9 1 kms in 191  
of which only as much as  0 2 kms was navigable by steamers, i.e. suitable for significant 
freight traffic. Not only ports, but the construction docks of Orsova (Or ova) and 
Komárom (Komarno) were also lost. As much as  0  of motor boats and  0  of track 
boats were inherited by the successor states. 
With the loss of Fiume, immediate access to the sea was lost for Hungary, which 
in turn made overseas export-import activities much more expensive. Transportation 
costs relating to the use of the Romanian and  ugoslavian railways connecting to the 
Adrian and Black Seas were significant. The situation was – somewhat – alleviated with 
the introduction of seafarer cargo boats on the Danube – the first of which was the 
B da e t – through which the  evant could be reached without intermediaries. 
Civil aviation, both passanger and cargo, both of which were only in the making 
on national and international levels, was not limited by the Treaty of Trianon. Aviation 
in the early 20th century developed at an enormous pace, but its level of technical 
development did not at the time make it a ma or means of transport yet. 
 
Con lusion 
Summing up the impact of Trianon on Hungarian transportation, it is easy to demonstrate 
that the new boundaries were, and continue to be, serious impediments to the life of 
Hungary. Although missing public roads were easier to replace, the replacement of many 
missing railway  unctures, due to financial, and partly also political, reasons, is yet to be 
implemented. In recent years, there appeared news about reconnecting torn railway 
connections in the framework of regional cooperation, such as the Ipolyság railroad or 
the plans for Szeged–Szabadka (Subotica), a realisation of these pro ects cannot be 
expected in the near future due to the lack of serious political will and sound financial 
background. 
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